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Abstract 
This paper employs maximum likelihood methods to analyze the 
increase in pious bequests in early modern French wills. Other 
historians have described the rise of pious bequests in wills, but no 
one has used multivariate statistical methods to explain the 
phenomenon. It turns out that at any level of wealth pious bequests 
rose over the course of the seventeenth century and that the bequests. 
were most pronounced among the literate and women. The paper argues 
that the increase in pious bequests was mark of growing support for 
the Counter Reformation, which attracted an inordinate nw;iber of 
supporters in educated circles and in the female population. 
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Historical Backround 
On the 28th of May, 1678, Pierre Remillier, a prosperous 
farmer in the village of Longes in southeastern France, called a 
notary to his sickbed. He was gravely ill, and being of advanced age, 
he feared he might never recover. He therefore wanted to divide his 
estate and settle his affairs on this earth, and so he summoned Floris 
Lentilhon, a notary in the nearby market town of Sainte Colombe, in 
order that Lentilhon might transcribe his last will and testament. 
When the notary arrived, Remillier at once began to dictate 
his will. Blessing himself, he said that ''as a good Christian and 
·Catholic I entrust my soul to God the Father Almighty and to his only 
begotten Son our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ.'' He then folded his 
hands in prayer and begged ''the most glorious Virgin Mary Mother of 
God'' to intercede for him and act as his ''advocate'' so that God would 
pardon his sins. He asked that he be interred in his family's grave 
at the parish church in Longes and requested his heirs to arrange for 
his funeral and for two anniversary masses after his death. 
After addressing these religions concerns, Remillier settled 
down to the task we normally associate with a will -- that of 
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distributing his estate to his heirs. Remillier had already given a 
considerable part of his property to his two married daughters in 
their marriage contracts, and in his will he gave each of them a small 
piece of land. He also left twenty ~ to his only other 
descendant, a granddaughter. The rest of his estate went to his wife. 
These material legacies, though, were bound up with additional 
religious bequests. In return for the property they received, 
Remillier's daughters were to have forty masses said at two nearby 
friaries for the repose of their father's soul. Similarly, 
Remillier's wife was to set aside ten livres from the estate for 
another twenty masses for his soul at the parish of Longes. Finally, 
Remillier left twenty bichets of rye (worth about 30 livres) to the 
poor who attended his memorial masses and prayed for him.I 
All told, Remillier spent 60 livres on posthumous masses and 
charity. This was a considerable sum at a time when a poor rural day 
laborer might earn only 100 livres a year. Remillier was thus making 
a significant gesture when he reserved 60 livres for pious bequests 
instead of giving it to his heirs. He clearly believed it was worth 
spending this money on masses and charity in order to improve his lot 
in the next world. Of course, he had every reason to act this way. 
Catholic theology assured him that charity and masses would spare him 
pain in the hereafter; indeed, such good works could even improve his 
his chances for salvation. In effect, Remillier was doing the 
impossible; by making pious bequests, he allowed his money to work for 
him even after death. 
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Strange as this behavior might seem to a modern reader, it was 
very common in late 17th-century France as well as elsewhere in 
Catholic Europe. Apparently, men and women were so committed to 
Catholicism that they almost invariably reserved a sum for masses and 
religious charity in their wills. What then do historians make of 
this widespread practice? At first glance, one might assume that it 
was merely an unvarying, rigid custom and therefore of little 
interest. But this is not what Michel Vovelle discovered in his 
celebrated work, Pi6t6 baroque et d6christianisation en Provence au 
18e siecle.2 Vovelle, a historian of the French Revolution, found 
that the practice of making pious bequests in wills grew far more 
common in the 17th and early 18th centuries and then waned after 1750, 
at least in far southern France. Pierre Chaunu, a social historian 
and demographer, unearthed a similar pattern in Paris in his La mort a 
Paris. 3 Both Vovelle and Chaunu interpreted the increase in pious 
bequests in the 17th century as a mark of the Counter Reformation: in 
their opinion, the massive campaign to attract the faithful undertaken 
by the Counter-Reformation Church in the 17th century had resulted in 
greater support for Catholicism and hence increased donations in the 
wills. Similarly, the decline in donations in the 18th century 
reflected growing anticlericalism on the eve of the French Revolution. 
Most historians have accepted Vovelle's and Chaunu's 
interpretation enthusiastically and perhaps a bit uncritically.4 1be 
enthusiasm of historians is readily explained. In the first place, 
the wills shed light on the religious behavior of numerous individuals 
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-- behavior which would otherwise be unknown to us. In cities such as 
Marseille, approximately 40% of the population left wills in the 18th 
century; in market towns and the countryside, testaments survive for 
60'lb or even 80'L of the populations.5 1be information these wills 
contain is obviously of great importance in the new social history and 
indeed in all early modern history, because religion dominated much 
of social and political life through the 19th century. More 
important, the wills allow historians to link religious behavior to a 
host of other variables~ a testator's occupation, sex, or education, 
for example ~ and thereby isolate those sections of society where 
Catholic practices were strongest or weakest. Vovelle and Chaunu 
would go even further. For them, the wills give evidence ~ot just of 
religious behavior but of religious attitudes. In their opinion, if a 
testator gave money to the Catholic Church or to the charities it 
extolled, then he was not simply a practicing Catholic but a devout 
one as well. Similarly, if he forgot the Church in his will, then his 
attachment both to Catholic ritual and to the Catholic faith were 
probably weak. 1bus Vovelle considers the decline in pious bequests 
after 1750 as a mark of alienation from Catholicism, and he notes that 
this hostility to the Church was particularly pronounced among the 
middle classes 
Revolution. 
a harbinger of their anticlericalism during the 
It ought to be pointed out that drawing inferences about 
religious attitudes and religious commitments from wills, as Vovelle 
and Chaunu do, is fraught with some largely unrecognized difficulties. 
s 
A will may accurately record charitable donations and the bequests for 
masses, but reasoning from these gestures back to the testator's 
actual beliefs requires no small leap of faith. To his credit, 
Vovelle acknowledges this difficulty in Pi~t~ baroque; other 
historians, however, are a bit cavalier in their treatment of the 
problem. They ignore the fact that a will may describe only the 
motidiis a testator went through and that it may say nothing of his 
true preferences. 
Nor is this the only difficulty with the works of Vovelle and 
Chaunu. Even if we consider their assertions simply as statements 
about the religious behavior recorded in the wills, their conclusions 
remain open to question. Did Catholic piety (in the narrow sense of 
behavior -- that is, the founding of masses and the stipulation of 
other bequests associated with Tridentine Catholicism) really increase 
during the 17th century, as both Vovelle and Chaunu maintain? Did 
these same practices then fall in the 18th century? Both authors 
present graphs and charts which show that a growing number of 
testators requested masses during the course of the 17th century and 
that this practice disappeared after 1750. Neither author, however, 
asks whether the changes he observed were statistically significant, 
and so we have no way of knowing whether the differences in the wills 
are merely statistical abberations. Lack of statistical technique 
also prevents Vovelle and Chaunu from distinguishing what is important 
from what is unimportant. As a result, they at times bury the reader 
with a confusing welter of charts and graphs, and their argument falls 
victum to the mindless empiricism that afflicts much recent social 
history. Worse yet, Vovelle and Chaunu rarely consider multivariate 
explanations. We learn, for example, that sex and social class 
affected the religious gestures individuals made in their wills, but 
these separate factors and others are never weighed together. 
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Vovelle and Chaunu also ignore alternative explanations of the 
phenomena they observe. They both view the growing number of 
religious bequests in the 17th century wills simply as a mark of the 
Counter Reformation. The trend, however, could also have resulted 
from declining prices for food, which swelled peoples' disposable 
income and allowed them to purchase such luxuries as masses for their 
souls. Unfortunately, neither Vovelle nor Chaunu considers this 
possibility. 
At the very least, then, early modern historians need a 
multivariate analysis of pious bequests made in the wills, an analysis 
that employs sophisticated statistical techniques to probe the 
differences in religious bequests among individuals and the change in 
pious bequests over time. Such an analysis would at least be far more 
efficient that the artisanal methods Chaunu and Vovelle employ, and it 
would allow researchers to confirm hypotheses and focus upon what is 
most significant. 6 In addition, the results could help give a much 
needed sense of direction to social historians working in this area. 
I have undertaken such a study with my own sample of wills 
both to test Vovelle's and Chaunu's assertions and to verify several 
of my own beliefs concerning support for the Counter Reformation in 
southeastern France. The wills I read come from a sample of 
microfilmed notarial registers from the department archives of the 
Rhone in Lyon. They were drawn up in the 16th, 17th, and early 18th 
centuries in the Lyonnais, the countryside west of Lyon on the banks 
of the Saone and Rhone rivers. While these testaments do not 
constitute a random sample of individual wills, this fact should not 
bias my conclusions.7 
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Like Vovelle and Chaunu. I labeled any demand for masses, any 
bequest to the Church, or any charitable donation a pious bequest. 8 My 
reason for doing so is that all such acts were encouraged by the 
Counter-Reformation Church and all the testators in my sample were 
Catholic. Throughout most of this paper I shall consider these pious 
bequests not as evidence of religious attitudes but simply as 
religious behavior promoted by the Church. Only at the end of the 
paper (and then only briefly) shall I turn to the question of how 
these religious acts are to be interpreted and whether they do reflect 
actual belief in Tridentine Catholicism. For the present, then, piety 
and pious bequests will refer not to internal convictions but merely 
to the sort of behavior the Counter-Reformation Church encouraged. 
Whether true devotion, lust for status. or other sentiments drove men 
to leave money in their wills is another matter. 
A number of hypotheses concerning the pious bequests need to 
be tested. First, did the bequests actually become more frequent over 
the course of the 17th century, as Vovelle, Chaunu and the literature 
on the Counter Reformation suggest? Second, did the value of the 
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bequests grow relative to individuals' wealth? If attitudes and 
preferences in fact changed, as Chaunu and Vovelle maintain, then the 
an1ount of money earmarked for pious bequests should grow relative to 
the total value of the testator's estate. Third, were women more 
likely to make pious bequests? Both Vovelle and Chaunu claim that 
women did give more frequently to the Church than men, and it can be 
argued that women in particular were drawn to Tridentine Catholicism 
because it offered them an outlet unavailable elsewhere in society.9 
Finally, were the literate more likely to give money to the Church 
than the illiterate? Chaunu suggests that they were. In his opinion, 
the literate stood a very good chance of encountering the voluminous 
body of Counter-Reformation literature which described how a good 
Catholic ought to confront death. According to Chaunu's research, 
over 80~ of all private libraries described in estate inventories 
contained one or more books describing the art of dying well.IO In 
these ars moriende, as they were called, the reader would learn that 
the making of a will was a spiritual exercise required by his faith 
and necessary to his salvation. Clearly, familiarity with such works 
might influence a testator. So too would familiarity with the whole 
body of literature which was produced by resurgent Catholicism and 
circulated among elites in the 17th century. 
Testing the Hypotheses 
In order to test the hypotheses concerning literacy and the 
other variables, we have to specify a relationship which describes how 
pious bequests are likely to vary from testator to testator. The 
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place to begin is the connection between bequests and the testator's 
wealth. If we make the eminently reasonable assumption that the 
richer a man is the more masses and other religious services he will 
purchase, then the amount M a testator allocates to pious bequests 
should be an increasing function of his estates's value W, for W acts 
as a budget constraint when the testator divides up his estate. The 
same should hold for the dummy variable P that equals 1 if the 
testator makes a pious request and is 0 otherwise. In order to test 
the hypotheses concerning sex (S), literacy (L) and the changes in 
pious donations over time, we can also suppose that M and P depend 
upon S, L and the year Y in which the testament was dictated. 
Finally, it is reasonable to expect that M and P also depend upon the 
testator's age A and the number of his children K. If attitudes and 
preferences did in fact change, for instance, older testators who were 
born before the shift in religious belief might well bequeath less to 
pious causes. Similarly, a testator with young, unmarried sons or 
daughters would in all likelihood feel compelled to provide for his 
children rather than to concern himself with his spiritual future.11 
As a first approximation, I assume that Mand P are linear 
functions of W, Y, S, L, A and K and that there are no interaction 
effects:l2 
( 1) P. 
1 a + bW i + cYi + dSi + eLi + fAi + gK1 + ui 
(2) Mi= a' + b'Wi + c'YI + d'Si + e'Li + f'Ai + g'Ki + vi 
Here the subscript i refers to the values observed for the i-th 
individual; a through g and a' through g' are constants; and ui and vi 
are error terms. 
With this specification, the expected value of a; (~) is 
a M E<ay <w» E(!. aM) W aY L w. 
Thus, if c' > 0,ai (~) > 0; or, in other words, if c' is positive, 
then the ratio of pious bequests to wealth increases over time. 
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Similarly, S and L will boost~ if d' and e' are positive. Hence we 
can reduce questions about the ratio ~ to questions about the 
coefficients c', d', e', etc. 
Unfortunately, the specifications 1 and 2 suffer from some 
rather annoying drawbacks. First of all, P is clearly dichotomous and 
M turns out to be truncated at zero. Blindly applying ordinary least 
squares regression (OLS) to estimate the coefficients in equations 1 
and 2 is therefore likely to be misleading. One solution to this 
problem is to employ maximum likelihood methods and use a probit 
specification for P and a tobit specification for M. 13 Specifically, 
we suppose that our dummy variable P actually reflects an unmeasured 
• • random variable P • This unmeasured P is an index of the likelihood 
that a given testator will make a pious bequest, and we assume that it 
is a linear function of our independent variables. Formally, 
P~ =a+ bW. + cY. + dS. + eL. + fA. + gK. + u. 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1, 
( l ') 
where the error terms ui are independent standard normal. We observe 
P = 1 when p* > 0, and P = 0 when p* i O. The tobit equation for M is 
similar. We assume that M simply reflects as unmeasured variable M*, 
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where 
M• = a' + b'W. + c'Y. + d'S. + e'L. + f'A. + g'K. + v. 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
(2 ') 
and vhere the error term vi is also normal. Again, we observe M when 
M• > 0, and in this case M = M•. Otherwise, M = O. With independent 
normal error terms, we can write down the likelihood functions for 
equations l' and 2' for given values of P, M and the independent 
variables. Maxim11111 likelihood estimates of the coefficients a through 
g and a' through g' can then be derived by means of an optimization 
algorithm. These estimates in turn permit a test of our hypotheses. 
Estimating both equations 1' and 2' actually turns out to be 
unnecessary. Once we have an e~timate for the tobit equation 2', we 
can use it to determine the behavior of p• and hence of P. In fact, 
if our estimate of the tobit equation yields 
• M = a' + b' Wi + c' Yi + d'Si + e' Li + f' Ai + g' Ki + vi, and if 
• 
the error term vi has standard error S, then p• =~will serve as an 
index of the likelihood of a pious bequest in equation 1'. Moreover, 
the probability that a given testator makes a pious bequest (i.e. the 
• 
probability that P = 1) will be F (~), where Fis the cumulative 
• 
standard normal distribution. Since this index ~ incorporates 
information about the amounts testators left the Church, it should 
provide a better measure of the relationship between P and the 
independent variables than the simple probit equation, which ignores 
the value of the pious bequests and takes into account only the fact 
that a bequest was made. We will therefore rely upon this index 
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• 
p• = t"- derived from the tobit equation to analyze the changes in the 
behavior of the dummy variable P.14 
While the problems with our dependent variables are readily 
surmounted, another difficulty with the two equations cannot be 
overcome so easily. This is the fact that the wills never actually 
mention W, the size of the testator's estate. In early modern France, 
a will normally disclosed the value of many of the testator's 
possessions, and it recorded his gifts to nearly all heirs. But it 
often omitted the price of pieces of real property, and it said 
nothing about the legacy of the ''universal heir,'' the person to whom 
the testator left the remainder of his estate after all other bequests 
had been made. 
Several possible solutions to this problem of the size of the 
estate suggest themselves. First, we could ignore the variable W, 
estimate the equation without it and use specification analysis to 
assess the effects of leaving W out. This method would permit a test 
of a number of the hypotheses despite our ignorance of the total value 
of the estate. 15 The problem, however, is that specification analysis 
does not carry over easily to maximum likelihood estimation of limited 
dependent variables.16 Therefore leaving W out does not solve our 
problem. We have to find a proxy for it. 
Three substitutes for W are available, and we shall try all 
three in order to verify that our conclusions are not overly sensitive 
to the choice of a proxy. The first is to invoke what we know about 
the testator's occupation. The wills invariably recorded what a man 
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or a single woman did for a living, and for married women or widows, 
the will gave the husband's work. Tax records provide an estimate of 
the average wealth for any occupation, since taxes were based, at 
least to a first approximation, upon a family's net worth. Evidence 
of familial wealth in marriage contracts tends to confirm the 
information in the tax records.17 And in the countryside, where most 
individuals worked the soil, the list of occupations was full enough 
to distinguish between landless agricultural laborers (ouvriers, 
journaliers), yeoman farmers (habitants), and wealthy landowners 
(sieurs villageois). 
The tax records and marriage contracts indicate that the 
testators fell into three broad categories of wealth. 18 The 
wealthiest, which I term the elite, consist of nobles, officers, 
judicial officials, notaries, sieurs villageois, bourgeois and 
merchants from market towns. The second, which has come to be known 
in French as the cogs du village, comprised prosperous farmers 
(habitants), artisans, and village merchants, who were in most cases 
indistinguishable from artisans. The third category, the peasants, 
contains the remainder of the populace, including laboureurs, 
vignerons, journaliers and domestics. 
Dividing the testators into these three categories does 
provide a rough control over the value of the estates. In particular, 
it compensates for any oversampling from the poor group in one period 
and from the elite in another. Nevertheless, it is obviously open to 
criticism. To begin with, the tripartite division of fortunes is too 
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simplistic. The poorest wealth class lumps together both small 
farners and agricultural wage laborers, while the elite group is even 
more disparate. And in a more general sense, even if the three 
categories manage to capture the distribution of fortunes at a given 
instant, they mask any changes in wealth over time. In particular, if 
the wealth of all occupations grew, the occupational categories might 
remain the same, and yet our increase in pious donations could then be 
the result of greater prosperity rather than a mark of heightened 
piety. 
It is true that the tripartite division simplifies the 
distribution of fortunes. Yet the evidence from tax records and 
marriage contracts suggests that the relative rank of the various 
occupations remained fairly stable during the Old Regime. 19 More 
important, there is no evidence that wealth increased across the board 
during the seventeenth century. In fact, both real wages and real 
returns from land leases stagnated or declined slightly. 20 In other 
words, the two major sources of income in the countryside ~ salaries 
and rents from ownership of land failed to grow during the years 
1600-1700. With incomes frozen, it is hard to see how fortunes could 
have swelled. One might argue that savings jumped, but no evidence 
supports this, and in fact the growing weight of taxation probably 
reduced the amount individuals could put aside. 
Our second proxy for wealth stems from a discovery Chaunu 
made, and it poses a different set of problems. In Paris, Chaunu was 
able to find estate inventories for a number of his testators, and he 
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discovered that the worth of a testator's estate invariably fell 
between 3 and 4 times the total of all bequests given a cash value in 
the will. 21 Although a value was often not assigned to real property 
and even to chattels in a will, a sum was almost always mentioned for 
bequests to inheritors other than the universal heir. The money due a 
legatee often represented the revenue from property holdings or a sum 
to be payed by the universal heir. These cash bequests were 
ultimately connected to the size of a testator's fortune, and it is 
thus no wonder Chaunu uncovered a relationship between the total of 
the bequests in a will and the value of an estate. Although he 
presents no statistical analysis which would make the relationship 
precise, he does claim that the multiplier applies equally to the 16th 
and 17th centuries. 
Unfortunately, linking wills and estate inventories is not 
possible in the Lyonnais. Inventories are far too rare in the local 
notarial archives, and they are not indexed as in Paris. Nevertheless, 
a similar relationship between cash bequests and wealth is likely to 
hold for the wills drawn up in the countryside around Lyon. One bit 
of evidence that is consistent with such an assumption is the 
relationship between total cash bequests and the wealth classes. The 
mean value of total bequests is much higher for members of the elite 
than for the other two wealth categories (see table 1). The relative 
level of T for each class also tends to parallel what we know about 
wealth from tax records and marriage contracts, so it seems reasonable 
to assume that Chaunu's relationship carries over to the Lyonnais. We 
CLASS 
ELITE 
TABLE I 
AVERAGE VALUE OF THE SECOND WEALTH 
PROXY T FOR WEALTH CLASSES 
AVERAGE VALUE 
OF T (LIVRES) 
3873.75 
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COQS DU VILL.AGE 378.41 
PEASANTS 
CLASS 
ELITE 
TABLE Z 
AVERAGE VALUE OF THIRD WEALTH 
PROXY D FOR EACH WEALTH CLASS 
241.27 
AVERAGE VALUE OF T 
(LIVRES) 
11130 
COQS DU VILLAGE 1120 
PEASANTS 790 
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will therefore assume that wealth W is proportional to total bequests 
T (in constant value livres).22 
Our third wealth proxy is derived from a simple assumption 
about doweries and inheritance practices. In the wills, testators 
with children commonly provided unmarried daughters with what were in 
effect doweries. In a family with several unmarried girls, each 
received a nearly identical amount. Unmarried sons enjoyed a similar, 
though smaller, inheritance, while married children (except for one 
who might be the universal heir) were usually given only a token 
legacy in the will. 
Apparently, the men and women who dictated wills were trying 
to compensate for the varying endowments and earning power of their 
children. A typical testator made his largest bequests to his younger 
daughters, who had few renumerative skills and who could not marry 
without a dowery. He gave each unmarried daughter nearly the same 
amount. Similarly, the testator commonly gave sizeable and nearly 
equal legacies to his younger sons, who had not yet established 
themselves in occupations. The younger sons received less, though, 
than their unmarried sisters, presumably because they could expect to 
earn more once they were established. Finally, the average testator 
bestowed only a token sum upon his married children. These older 
married children had been provided for in marriage contracts, and they 
were had work and families. 
This pattern of bequests suggest that testators were trying to 
treat all heirs equally. One might object, of course, that the 
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treatment of heirs could not possibly be egalitarian since each 
testator singled out one person as his universal heir. This universal 
heir, who received the remainder of the estate after all other 
bequests were satisfied, would presumably receive a larger share like 
the eldest son in a regime of primogeniture. Indeed, legal historians 
might argue that the very purpose of the written will was to allow the 
testator to leave ali of his real property to his universal heir. By 
favoring this heir, a testator would avoid fragmenting his estate. 
Favoritism of this sort would be all the more likely in our wills, for 
the Lyonnais was an area of written law, and local legal practice gave 
the testator great latitude in the division of his estate. In 
contrast to regions of customary law, a testator in the Lyonnais could 
I 
single our one of his heirs for special treatment when he drew up his 
testament. 23 
Upon closer inspection, however, this argument against 
egalitarian inheritance collapses. In the first place, the universal 
heir hardly played the role of the favored son under primogeniture. 
The universal heir could be a daughter, a son, a spouse, a nephew or a 
more distant relative or friend. He could be first born or last born, 
cousin or grandchild or even neighbor. More important, it is clear 
that the universal heir did not receive the bulk of the estate. He 
may have received most of the family's land, but he normally had to 
pay doweries and other large bequests to the other heirs out of his 
own inheritance. These obligations formed a significant fraction of 
the estate, and paying them would reduce the universal heir's 
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inheritance close to portion accorded the other heirs. In fact, in 
the few instances where historians have managed to track down a large 
set of family documents, the universal heir did not do much better 
than the others, once his share was adjusted for all of all the debts 
and obligations he owed. 24 It should also be pointed out that the law 
itself actually limited the favoritism a testator could show his 
universal heir. Despite the great freedom of legal practices in the 
Lyonnais, a testator had to leave each of his descendants a certain 
minimum fraction of his estate called the legitime. The legitime 
insured that a given testament could not depart radically from 
egalitarianism, and for our purposes the effects of any possible 
deviation from equal treatment of heirs would be relatively minor. 25 
All things considered, the inheritance regime in the Lyonnais was 
surprisingly egalitarian. 
Again, one might contend that such customs would fragment 
estates. They would, if families were large, but in the Lyonnais 
delayed marriage and the small family size made equal treatment of 
heirs possible. 26 So did the availability of labor intensive farming 
practices such as viticulture. 27 Given such an egalitarian pattern of 
inheritances, we can thus argue that each heir received an inheritance 
roughly equivalent to that bestowed upon younger daughters. Unmarried 
sons got a slightly smaller amount, but their greater endowments or 
greater human capital -- for example, a skill that a son might have 
learned from his father -- made up for the difference. As for older 
children, they had already taken their shares of the estate in 
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marriage contracts. We can therefore approximate the size of the 
estate by multiplying the total number of heirs by the cash value of 
the share accorded each one. The value of this share would be the 
amount given an heir who was bereft of assets, skills and human 
capital -- in short, the dowery given an unmarried daughter. In sum, 
for those wills which mentioned doweries, W = D + i where D is the 
product of the average dowery time the total number of heirs and i is 
an error term. 28 Even if inheritances are not perfectly equal, D 
will in all likelihood provide an excellent index of the testator's 
wealth. 29 
Before accepting this third measure of wealth, we would verify 
that it is consistent with the previous two. For those wills which 
mention doweries, D does agree with our first wealth proxy (see table 
2). Similarly, D and the second proxy Tare closely related. If our 
assumptions are correct, they should be linear functions of one 
another, and in fact the correlation coefficient between D and T is 
97.5~. A regression of Don T and Y suggests, moreover, that the 
relationship between the two variables does not vary over time. 
For each of three wealth proxies, I have tried both OLS and 
maximum likelihood methods (tobit) to estimate the relationship 
between Mand the independent variables (table 3). Since the wills do 
not record a testator's age directly, I have used the presence of 
grandchildren, grandnephews, grandnieces, or second generation cousins 
as a proxy for age. Normally this would be a very poor substitute for 
age itself, but the late age of marriage makes it more accurate than 
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TABLE 3 
OLS & MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES FOR M, THE AMOUNT 
OF PIOUS BEQUESTS IN LIVRES (CONSTANT VALUE). 
INDEPENDENT WEALTH WEALTH WEALTH 
VARIABLE PROXY I PROXY II PROXY III 
OLS TOBIT OLS TOBIT OLS TOBIT 
CClNSTANT -1.855 x 10 3 -1.198 x 103 -1.933 x 102 -1.148 x 103 -1.344 x 102 -1.163 x 103 
(-11.26) (-10 .91) (-6. 81) 
WEALTH VARIABLES: 
xl 0.287 x 102 0.462 x 102 
(3. 85) (3.35) 
x2 0.183 x 101 0.140 x 102 
(0.53) ( 1. 76) 
T ----- ----- 0.195 x 10-2 -2 0.382 x 10 
(1.57) (1. 72) 
-2 -2 D ----- ----- ----- ----- 0.535 x 10 1.212 x 10 
(3 .23) ( 3. 9 7) 
OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
y 0.116 0. 701 0.121 0.674 0.082 0.678 
(4.13) (10.94) (4.11) (10 .61) (1. 97) (6.65)" 
s 0.075 x 102 0.135 x 102 0.100 x 102 0.192 x 102 0.096 x 102 0.206 x 102 
(2. 34) (1.94) (2.96) (2. 77) (1.98) (2.00) 
L 0.230 x 102 0.267 x 102 0.358 x 102 0.477 x 102 0.243 x 102 0.293 x 102 
(3.76) (2.33) ( 6. 5 7) (4. 83) ( 3 .07) (2.05) 
A -0.104 x 102 -0.281 x 10
2 
-0.100 x 102 -0 .299 x 102 -0.177 x 102. -0.404 x 10
2 
(-1.49) (-1. 76) (-1. 39) (-1. 88) (-1.19) (-1. 35) 
K -0.163 x 101 -0.406 x 101 -0.213 x 101 -0 .571 x 101 -0.157 x 10
1 
-0 .505 x 101 
(-1.92) (-2 .14) (-2.40) (-2.96) (-1.25) (-1.84) 
s 
R2 
F 
-2 x log of 
likelihood 
function 
N 
Limit Observations 
Non-limits 
PROXY I 
OLS 
36. 72 
16.8% 
16.34 
(7 ,568) df 
576 
TOBIT 
61.00 
----
----
2.646 x 103 
576 
358 
218 
TABLE 3 
(CONTINUED) 
PROXY II PROXY III 
OLS TOBIT OLS 
37 .98 61.37 35.40 
15.5% ---- 16.1% 
16.47 ---- 7.57 
(6. 537) df (6,237)df 
---- 2 .625 x 103 ----
544 544 244 
---- 327 ----
---- 217 ----
Note: Number in parentheses is the value of the coefficient divided by its estimated standard error. 
All monetary amounts in deflated livres. Number of cases varies due to discarded missing values. 
x1 = 1 for members of elite; 0 otherwise 
x2 = 1 for cogs du village; 0 otherwise 
T = Total bequests which are given a cash value in will 
D = Total number of heirs times average dowery 
Y = Year 
S = 0 for makes, 1 for females 
L = 1 for those who can sign, 0 for those who cannot sign 
A = Age dummy; equals 1 of testator has grandchildren, grandnephews and nieces, or second generation cousins 
s = Estimated standard deviation of equation error term 
F MSS /MSS (regressions only) reg res 
N = Number of cases 
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TOBIT 
56.68 
1.130 x 103 
244 
149 
95 
we would usually expect. Similarly, I have used ability to sign the 
will as a mark of literacy.30 
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What is most remarkable about the estimates in tables 3 and 4 
is the stability of the coefficient c' of the year Y. The three 
wealth proxies yield c' = .701, .674, and .678 for the tobit equation 
equation 2', and the OLS estimates of are also stable, though lower. 
One of the reasons the OLS estimates are smaller is that the 
coefficients in the regression equation do not have the same meaning 
they do in the tobit equation. In the regression equation, the 
coefficients simply measure the expected change in the dependent 
variable for a unit change in one of the independent variables. The 
OLS coefficient c', for example, measures a~4M>, the change in the 
expected value of M with respect to Y. For the tobit equation, 
though, the coefficients no longer have this simple interpretation. 
The expected rate of change of M in the tobit equation has to take 
into account both the size of a bequest, if one is made, and the 
probability that there is no bequest. It turns out that the rate of 
change of M with respect to a given independent variable is no longer 
simply the corresponding coefficient, nor is it even a constant. 
Indeed, it depends on the value of the other independent variables.31 
One way to render the tobit coefficients comparable to the 
regression results is actually to calculate how M responds to changes 
in the independent variables. I have performed this calculation for 
the expected rate of change of M with respect to Y and several other 
independent variables in equation 2' (table 4). In each case, I have 
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evaluated the rate of change while the various independent variables 
are set equal to their mean values. The figures in table 4 can then 
be compared directly to the OLS coefficients in table 3. In the case 
of the date Y, the values of a~iMl vary little from wealth proxy to 
wealth proxy. They are also close to the corresponding OLS estimates, 
but they always hover slightly above the OLS figures. In part, the 
higher value of the tobit estimates results from the fact that M is 
truncated. Y after all has a significant effect upon M, but OLS would 
understate this effect by fitting a straight line to what is actually 
a curve. 
It is possible to make similar calculations for a~4P>, the 
expected rate of change P with respect to the date Y. 32 Here a~4Pl 
measures how a change of the year affects the chances that a testator 
makes a pious bequest. Again, because the value of 
the other independent variables, we have calculated 
aE(P) 
aY 
aECPl 
aY 
depends on 
with the 
independent variables set equal to their mean values. We have 
performed the same calculation for the rates of change of P with 
respect to the other independent variables as well (table 5). 
The positive value of a~fPl reflects the increasing frequency 
of pious bequests in the wills. From nobles to peasants, testators 
were more and more likely to remember the church over the course of 
the 17th century (table 6). The actual amount of money left to the 
Church also jumped, as the positive coefficient of Yin equation 2' 
indicates. Since the tobit equation with the various proxies yielded 
an estimate for a!4M) between 0.157 and 0.174. we would expect that 
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TABLE 4 
EXPECTED RATES OF CHANGE OF M WITH RESPECT TO 
THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES IN THE TOBIT EQUATION 
INDEPENDENT WEALTH WEALTH WEALTH 
VARIABLE PROXY I PROXY II PROXY III 
Wealth Variables 
xl 0.112 x 102 
x2 0.340 x 101 
-2 T ---- 0.098 x 10 
-2 D ---- ---- 0.281 x 10 
Other Variables 
y 0 .170 0.174 0.157 
s 0.033 x 102 0.049 x 10 
2· 0 .048 x 102 
L 0.065 x 102 0.123 x 102 0.068 x 102 
A -0 .068 x 102 -0 .077 x 102 -0.094 x 102 
K -0.098 x 101 -0.147 x 101 -0.117 x 101 
NOTE: All independent variables have been set equal to their means. 
TABLE 5 
ciE(P), THE RATE OF CHANGE OF P 
ax. 
l. 
WITH RESPECT TO THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
INDEPENDENT WEALTH WEALTH WEALTH 
VARIABLE PROXY I PROXY II PROXY III 
Wealth Variables 
Xl .237 
X2 .072 
T ---- 0.103 
D ---- ---- 0.652 x 10 -4 
Other Variables 
y 0 .359 x 10 -2 0.355 x 10 -2 0.365 x 10 -2 
s 0.069 0.101 0.111 
L 0.137 0.251 0.158 
A -0.144 -0.157 -0.217 
K -0.021 -0.030 -0.027 
NOTE: The numbers represent the expected change in P for a unit change in 
a given independent variable. All independent variables are assumed 
to be at their mean values. 
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TABLE 6 
PERCENT OF TESTATORS MAKING PIOUS 
the average donation by a typical testator would grow a little less BEQUESTS BY WEALTH CLASS 
than 2 livres each decade. 33 Furthermore, since c' is positive, the ELITE COQS PEASANTS TOTAL 
ratio of pious donations to wealth should also increase, and if we DU VILLAGE 
divide M by the wealth proxies T and D, we do in fact observe marked 
growth after the sixteenth century (see tables 7 and 8). In short, DATE 
pious bequests did grow relative to wealth. BEFORE 1550 67% 100% 0% 80% 
The data in tables 3 to 5 also bear out Vovelle's and Chaunu's (3) (2) (O) (5) 
assertions about the role of literacy and sex. Apparently, being 1550-74 0% 4% 10% 9% 
literate or being a woman increased both the likelihood of pious (0) (26) (79) (105) 
bequests and the amount given to the Church. For a testator of 1575-99 71% 14% 10% 15% 
average wealth, literacy raised the chances of a bequest by 14 to 25 ( 7) (28) (79) (114) 
percentage points, and it boosted the expected bequest by 6 or 12 1600-24 67% 55% 26% 41% 
livres, if we believe the figures in tables 4 and 5. Chaunu, of (3) (29) (34) (66) 
course, would explain the predilections of the literate by citing the 1625-49 0% 58% 52% 54% 
pervasive Counter-Reformation literature on death, and in a a more (0) (12) (42) (54) 
general sense, the behav-ior of the literate testifies to the appeal 1650-74 60% 36% 50% 45% 
the Counter-Reformation had among educated classes. As for women, (5) (14) (10) (29) 
they did bequeath more to the Church than male counterparts of equal 1675-99 27% 38% 31% 32% 
worth. They were 7% to 11% more likely to leave pious bequests, if we ( 11) (21) (72) (104) 
believe the estimates in table 5, and what they did leave was 1700-24 89% 88% 90% 90% 
typically 3 to 5 livres higher. The higher values of their pious (9) (16) (62) (87) 
donations are yet another sign of enormous appeal the Counter- AFTER 1725 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Reformation had for women. (6) (6) (24) (36) 
The negative coefficient for A in the equation for M suggests 
TOTAL 66% 41% 38% 41% 
that pious giving was not a habit learned in the later years of life. (44) (154) (402) (600) 
NOTE: Upper figure is percent of wills in each category which contain pious 
bequests. Lower figure is number of cases per category. Total 
number of cases differs from regression tables because of exclusion 
of cases with missing values. 
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TABLE 7 TABLE 8 
AVERAGE VALUE OF RATIO OF PIOUS BEQUESTS TO URAT.TH AVERAGE VALUE OF THE RATIO OF PIOUS BEQUESTS TO WEALTH 
USING PROXY II AS A MEASURE OF REI.ATIVE WEALTH USING PROXY III AS A MEASURE OF WEALTH 
ELITE COQS PEASANTS TOTAL ELITE COQS PEASANTS TOTAL 
DU DU 
VILLAGE VILLAGE 
DATE 1550-74 0.00% 0.08% 0.01% 0.03% 
(0) (13) (28) (41) 
BEFORE 1550 0.0 1.00 0.0 0.50 
1 1 0 2 1575-99 0.13% 0.00% 0.06% 0.06% 
(3) (5) (26) (34) 
1550-74 0.0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0 24 52 76 1600-24 0.11% 0.27% 0.03% 0.11% 
(2) (10) (18) ( 30) 
1575-99 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
6 21 69 96 1625-49 0.00% 2.00% 0. 72% 0.90% 
(0) (3) (19) (22) 
1600-24 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.04 
3 25 25 53 1650-74 4.76 0.91 0.17 1.43 
(3) (7) (5) (15) 
1625-49 0.0 0.10 0.10 0.10 
0 9 37 46 1675-99 2.00% 0.54% 0.40% 0.54% 
(3) (9) (30) (42) 
1650-74 0.04 0.02 0.16 0.07 
5 13 9 27 1700-24 0.36% 3.77% 8.07% 6.77% 
(2) (10) (33) (45) 
1675-99 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.07 
9 20 67 96 AFTER 1725 8.55% 10.37% 3.31% 4.95% 
(2) ( 2) (11) (15) 
1700-24 0.37 0.19 0.26 0.26 
9 16 61 86 TOTAL 2.58% 1.35% 1.95% 1.84% 
(15) (59) (170) (244) 
AFTER 1725 0.38 0.20 0.20 0.23 
6 5 22 33 NOTE: Upper figure in each box is mean of lOOM . Figure in parentheses 
is total number of wills per category~ 
TOTAL 0.18 0.07 0.09 0.09 39 134 342 515 
NOTE: Upper figure is mean value of M/T. Figure in parentheses is total 
number of wills per category. Number of cases differs from 
regression tables because of exclusion of cases with missing values. 
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The evidence is weak, however, for the t-statistics of the coefficient 
of A never exceed 1.88. A better measure of age might well improve 
matters here. since our proxy for A does little more than to 
distinguish middle aged adults from their elders. The negative 
coefficient for K, though, is much closer to being significant. 
Dependent children evidently did force a testator to choose between 
his off spring and his soul. 
Refinements 
So far we have ignored the fact that the use of proxy 
variables are likely to bias our coefficient estimates. If M were not 
a limited dependent variable, we could estimate the direction of this 
bias caused by the errors in observing W. It would turn out that 
under certain reasonable assumptions about the relationship between 
the independent variables, the coefficients of Y and S would be biased 
downward. So would the coefficient of L. at least with proxy I; with 
proxies II and III; it would be pushed upward. 34 With the tobit 
equation. however, calculating the direction of the bias is not easy. 
Approximations for the asypmptotic bias are available, but they shed 
no light on its sign. 35 All we ·know is that the asymptotic bias will 
(to a close approximation) consist of two terms, one of the same sign 
and order of magnitude is that produced by OLS. and the other roughly 
the same size but of indeterminate sign. 
Our interest. of course, is knowing whether the bias is large 
enough to reverse the signs of the coefficients for Y, S or L in 
equation 2' or whether it might make a coefficient near zero appear 
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safely positive. Th'ree reasons suggest that this will not happen. 
The first is the robustness of the results. Nearly all the different 
wealth proxies yield similar values for the coefficients of s. L and 
especially Y. If the error term in the proxies affected the 
coefficients seriously. the values would presumably vary significantly 
from pro:icy to proxy. yet this is simply not the case. Another reason 
for suspecting that our coefficients are not seriously biased comes 
from an instrumental variables estimate for equation 2'. The 
instrumental variables estimate combines information from wealth 
proxies I and II and uses a two-stage estimator to derive coefficients 
(table 9).36 To the extent that we have a successful instrument, this 
procedure ought to reduce the bias of our coefficient estimates. yet 
in nearly every case the estimates remain· about the same. This 
suggests that the bias is not serious. Finally. it is likely that the 
OLS estimates provide lower bounds for the coefficients c'. d'. and e' 
of Y, s. and L. Since all the OLS estimates of these coefficients are 
positive. the real values in the tobit equation probably exceed zero 
too. We can even argue that the bias of the tobit coefficients c'. d' 
and e' will probably have the same direction as the bias in tile 
corresponding OLS coefficients. Since the use of proxies will drive 
the OLS estimates of c'. d' and e' toward zero (fore' this is true 
only with proxy I), the tobit procedure is will also underestimate 
these coefficients. especially in the case of Y. 37 
One other matter also deserves our attention. So far. we have 
attributed the increasing likelihood of pious bequests simply to the 
TABLE 9 
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES 
ESTIMATES USING WEALTH PROXY I AND II 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES TSLS TOBIT 
Wealth 
-2 -2 Instrument 0.643 x 10 0.950 x 10 
y 0.147 0. 735 
s 0.111 x 102 0.197 x 10
2 
L 0.286 x 102 o. 380 x 10
2 
A -0.091 x 102 -0.275 x 10
2 
K -0.255 x 102 -0.554 x 10
2 
NOTE: Coefficients in the Equation for P and M were derived by estimating 
the following equation system: 
Mi 
T. 
l. 
a'+ b'Ti + c'Yi + d'Si + e'Li + f'Ai + g'Ki + ui' 
h' + kXl. + 1X2. + w' .. 
l. l. l. 
Here T. is wealth proxy II, Xl and X2 are dummy variables for 
member~hip in the first two wealth classes, and the other terms 
are as in equation 2'. To solve the two systems, we first regress 
T. on the exogenous variables Xl, X2, Y, S, L, A and K. We then 
uge the resulting predicted value of T. as an instrument in the 
equation for M, which has been estimat~d using both least squares 
and maximum likelihood methods. This two stage process provides 
consistent estimates for limited dependent variables just as in 
the ordinary regression case. 
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passage of time. But if the secular trend alone were responsible for 
the growing number of pious bequests, then we would expect the 
frequency of donations to the Church to rise smoothly over the course 
of the 17th century. So would the amount donated to the Church. For 
example, in the case an illerate man whose total legacies amounted to 
241.27 livres -- the average figure for a peasant -- the chances of 
giving would follow the steady increases set forth in column 1 of 
table 10. 
This smoothe and regular behavior, though, is not what we 
observed. The men and women who drew up the wills in our sample did 
not behave with such monotonous regularity, as tables 6, 7 and 8 show. 
Their donations rose through 1650-75 but then collapsed during the 
last quarter of the seventeenth century, when the percentage of wills 
with pious bequests plunged from 45% to 32%. Donations as a percent 
of wealth also dropped. Only after 1700 did pious giving recover. 
What accounts for this precipitous decline in pious bequests 
at the end of the 17th century? And in a more general sense, what 
causes the observed values of P to rise so far above the predictions 
after 1700? For 1700-24 and the post 1725 period, the observed value 
of P exceeds 90%, but the predictions in column 1 are only 48'Ji and 59'51 
(table 10, columns 1 and 4). What produces this growing discrepency? 
Let us consider first of all the question of why donations 
plummeted in 1675-99. Several possible explanations immediately come 
to mind. In the first place, the predictions in column 1 of table 10 
may simply exaggerate the discord between the results described by 
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TABLE 10 
OBSERVED AND PREDICTED 
VALUES OF P FOR PEASANTS 
(1) (2) ( 3) (4) 
DATE 
1550-74 0.04 0.07 0.05 0.10 
1575-99 0.08 0.09 0.11 0.10 
1600-24 0.13 0.14 0.17 0.26 
1625-49 0.19 0.23 0.26 0.52 
1650-74 0.27 0.38 0.44 0.50 
1675-99 0.37 0.37 0.29 0.31 
1700-24 0.48 0.52 0.53 0.90 
AFTER 1725 0.59 0.67 0.73 1.00 
NOTE: Column 1 is predicted P using wealth proxy II with T = 241.27 livres 
(average for peasants), S = L = 0, A= .0551, K = 1.4743 (over~ 
averages for A and K). Column 2 is predicted P using wealth proxy II; 
all independent variables are set equal to their means for peasants 
during the period in question. Column 3 is predicted P using wealth 
proxy II and additional variables for economic expectation, population, 
and the price of a mass; all independent variables are set equal to 
their means for peasants during the period in question. Column 4 
is observed P for peasants. 
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equation 2' and the actual evidence from the wills. Column 1 
presupposes that all the independent variables except the year remain 
constant, and this is clearly not the case. In fact, the testators 
from 1675-1699 were older and more likely to be illiterate and they 
had large numbers of unmarried children. All of these differences 
could depress their pious bequests relative to the previous 
generation. 
Taking these differences into account should reduce the gap 
between the predicted and the observed value of P at the end of the 
17th century, but it does not. For a peasant, the predicted value of 
P stills hovers around 37%, well above the 31% actually observed. 
(table 10, column 2). Clearly, the shift in the values of the 
independent variables cannot account for the drop in pious bequests. 
Indeed, if we introduce into equation 2' a dllDlllly variable Q which is 1 
when 1675 i Yi 1699 and 0 otherwise, the dummmy variable's 
coefficient is negative and significant, whether we use OLS or tobit. 
(table 11). Thus the decline in donations is not simply the result of 
different values for the independent variables. 
If we look at the wills from 1675-99 to see what brought pious 
donations temporarily to a halt, the evidence points to a break in the 
years 1679-80. In the first place, the wills from the period 1675-
1699 tend to cluster in the years 1675-85; they are not spread out 
over the entire 25-year period. This suggests that there was 
something of a turning point at the end of the 1670s or the beginning 
of the 1680s. Upon closer inspection, it in fact turns out that 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
Q 
y 
s 
L 
R2 
TABLE 11 
SELECTED COEFFICIENTS IN THE 
EQUATION FOR M WITH DUMMY VARIABLES Q ADDED 
OLS TOBIT 
-9. 772 -36.530 
(2 .13) (4.05) 
0.145 0. 720 
(4. 61) (11. 31) 
.099 x 102 0.198 x 102 
( 2. 9 3) (2.87) 
0.338 x 102 0.417 x 102 
(6 .12) ( 4. 21) 
16.3% 
NOTE: Estimates have been made with wealth proxy II. Figures in 
parentheses are t-statistics or the value of the coefficient 
divided by its estimated standard error. 
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before 1680 testators regularly included pious bequests in their wills 
I 
whereas after 1680 they ceased to do so, at least in a half dozen 
villages southwest of Lyon where a major portion of the wills from 
this period were drawn up. 
None of the surviving records in these communities points to 
any peculiar local events that might have stopped pious giving in 
1680, but one fact of royal politics at the time could conceivably 
have played a role: Louis XIV's persecution of the Protestants. In 
1680 the sun king began to crack down upon the Huguenots in earnest. 
A. number of professions and government offices were closed to 
Protestants, and the persecution only intensified over the next five 
years. Conceivably, a number of the testators after 1680 could have 
been former Protestants who had converted to Catholicism to escape 
persecution but who had no intention whatsoever of leaving money to a 
religion they secretly despised. 
The problem with this explanation is that few Protestants 
actually lived in the Lyonnais at this time, though some did reside to 
the southwest of the city, not far from the villages where a number of 
the wills were drawn up. Furthermore, this explanation does not 
readily explain why Protestants suddenly flocked to a new Catholic 
notary in 1680. After all, in nearby Grenoble Protestants continued 
to use their old notaries and to identify themselves openly as 
Protestants in their wills up to the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes 
in 1685.38 The persecution evidently did not affect the way 
Protestants in Grenoble dictated their wills, and there is no reason 
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why Protestants in the Lyonnais would behave any differently. 
The fitful pace of the Counter Reformation itself provides 
another possible explanation for the decline in giving in the 1680's. 
In Lyon, as elsewhere in Catholic Europe, institutional reform within 
the Catholic Church was far from a steady process. The local 
hierarchy sponsored missions and undertook parish visits at a furious 
pace though mid-century. The visits and missions then slackened off 
until the late 1680's and 1690's. The training of priests went 
through similar cycles. Enrollments of long term students in the 
major seminary in the diocesan seminaries rose to 55 in 1675-76 and 
then dropped to 15 in 1680. The number of students remained low until 
after 1694.39 The pattern of all the hierarchy's activities~ 
whether it be proselytizing or the education of trained clerymen --
thus seems to have leveled off after mid-century and declined after 
the 1670s. Not until the 1690s did the Church return to the dynamism 
of the period before 1670. 
Conceivably, the collapse of the Church's efforts could have 
caused pious bequests to drop in the years i680-85. With fewer 
missions and fewer trained priests preaching in the villages, the 
impetus to remember the Church in one's will may well have slackened. 
The difficulty with this argument, though, is that it simply strains 
our credulity. It is hard to see how even a precipitous decline in 
the number of priests could have affected religious behavior so 
rapidly and so drastically and yet have left no long term 
consequences. It is simply unbelievable. 
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A far more likely explanation for the decline of pious 
bequests after 1680 was the traumatic agricultural depressiou that 
struck the Lyonnais at the end of the 1670s. Both leases on 
agricultural land and indexes of agricultural output dropped over 40%; 
they did not recover until 1690s.40 Rents and output had always 
fluctuated to a certain degree, but a depression of this magnitude was 
unknown from 1600 through the first decades of the 18th century. This 
sudden depression left some mark on our proxies for wealth, which were 
lower for the period 1675-1699, but the proxies or even exact 
knowledge of testator's wealth when he drew up his will could hardly 
register the full impact of such a sudden depression. The proxies, 
after all, merely suggest what a man's fortune was at one time. They 
do not tell whether his estate had been growing or diminishing, and 
they do not reveal his expectations for the future. For our testators 
in the early 1680s, though, consideration of growth rates and expected 
returns in the future were probably crucial. Unlike testators in 
other periods, the men and women who drew up wills in the early 1680s 
watched agricultural revenues plummet. They therefore had to revise 
drastically their estimates of what their estates could produce for 
their descendants. No doubt they cut their pious bequests because 
future looked so grim. When the rural economy recovered in the 1690s, 
though, they returned to making pious bequests in their wills. 
To test this rigorously, of course, we would need an index of 
people's expectations. A good measure of economic expectations is 
hardly available for current problems, much less for the early modern 
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period, but changes in regional agricultural lease rates can serve as 
a rough substitute. While an index of lease rates is admittedly a 
poor measure of changing expectations, the fluctuations of the index 
should bear some relationship to expected agricultural profits. And 
when added to the tobit equation 2', the lease rate index has a 
positive coefficient and seems highly significant (t = 2.64). Adding 
the lease index does not disturb the other coefficients or their 
statistical significance, and the index drops enough in the late 1670s 
to explain explain a decline of approximately 10 percentage points in 
P during the last quarter of the 17th century (table 12).41 It thus 
seems clear that changing economic circumstances do explain much of 
the fluctuation in pious giving, fluctuations that Vovelle and Chaunu 
invariably attribute to purely religious causes. 
Besides the index of lease rates, two other variables deserve 
to be added to the tobit equation for M: the minimum offering needed 
for a mass and the population of the community where the testator 
lived. 42 In a sense, both of these variables reflect the ''supply'' of 
religious services available to the testator. The minimum offering 
needed for a mass was set by the diocese, and it obviously served as a 
''price'' when the testator decided upon his pious bequests. It may of 
course seem anachronistic to impose this economic terminology upon a 
religious decision, but the testators themselves would not think so. 
They were terribly concerned with the process of paying for the 
masses, and they described in great detail the amounts to be paid for 
prayers and other services. The only reason that 
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
CONSTANT 
T 
y 
s 
L 
A 
K 
INDEX 
POP 
PRICE 
s 
R2 
F 
-2 x log of 
likelihood 
func;tion 
N 
Limit Observations 
TABLE 12 
OLS AND TOBIT ESTIMATES FOR M 
WITH ADDITIONAL INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
OLS TOBIT 
2.256 x 10 2 1.259 x 10 3 
(11. 34) 
0.237 x 10 -2 0 .466 x 10-2 
(l.91) (2.12) 
0 .142 0. 749 
(4.46) (10.93) 
0.101 x 102 0.188 x 102 
(3.01) (2. 73) 
0.287 x 102 0.368 x 102 
(4.97) (3.60) 
-0.106 x 102 -0.302 x 102 
(-1.48) (-1.90) 
-0.196 x 101 -0.513 x 101 
(-2.21) (-2. 70) 
0.584 x 10-l 3.034 x 10-l 
(l.08) (2.64) 
0.237 x 10 -2 0.273 x 10 -2 
(3.20) (2.31) 
-0 .808 x 101 -2.444 x 101 
(-0. 70) (-1.03) 
37 .63 60.14 
17 .5% 
12.62 
(9 ,534) dF 
---- 2 .610 x 104 
544 544 
---- 327 
Non Limit Observations 
---- 217 
NOTE: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. Estimates have been made 
with wealth proxy II. Index, an index of agricultural lease rates, 
serves as a rough measure of economic expectations. Pop, the nwnber 
of households in the testator's community at the end of the 17th 
century, is an indirect measure of population. Price is the minimum 
offering needed for a mass in constant value livres. Other variables 
are in Table 3. ---
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the minimum offering for a mass was not included in equation 2' 
initially is that it varied only slightly in real terms. As it first 
approximation, it was therefore reasonable to treat it as a constant. 
When the price is added to equation 2', its coefficient has the 
expected negative sign, but the lack of variation keeps it from being 
statistically significant (table 12). 
The population of a community also affected the supply of 
religious services. Market towns and small cities stood a greater 
chance of having a monastary or friary, and they often boasted more 
priests and more churches per capita. Furthermore, the bigger 
communities were more likely to call in holiday pr'eachers and 
missions; residents of more populous communities thus experienced more 
frequent proselytizing. Since a larger population meant a greater and 
more varied array of alternatives for pious bequests, it is no wonder 
that population had a significant positive effect upon M (table 12). 
Adding these new variables, though, does not explain why the 
observed values of P rose to such heights after 1700. Even when the 
lease index, the price of a mass and the population are added to 
equation 2', the predicted value of P after 1725 is only 73~. while 
the observed Preaches lOO'L (table 10, columns 3 and 4). Perhaps 
these high values of P testify to the Church's activity at the end of 
the 17th century, but they are equally likely to stem from a more 
mundane cause: the bias of the coefficient for Y. If (as we argued 
above) the coefficient is biased toward 0, then equation 2' will 
understate the increase in P over time, and the observed values of P 
44 
will tend to exceed the predictions as we move toward the end of the 
17th century. 43 
Conclusion 
Generalizing from this sample of wills to any larger 
population is of course fraught with difficulty. Normally, the high 
t-statistics for S and L and the even larger t-statistics for Y would 
assure us that the relationships we unearthed extend beyond this 
sample. 44 The use of the proxies for wealth, though, will affect the 
estimates of the t-statistics, and as a result we must generalize with 
caution. One source of confidence, through, is the robustness of the 
results. Different assumptions and different techniques yield similar 
values for the coefficients and nearly identical conclusions about the 
role of sex and literacy and about the shift in religious behavior 
over time. 45 Moreover, to argue that pious bequests increased 
dramatically in the 17th century and that at all levels of wealth 
women and the literate gave more to the Church is consistant with 
Vovelle's and Chaunu's findings. If they lacked statistical 
sophistication, a highly quantitative study currently under way in 
Grenoble confirms their results. 46 With all due caution, the 
relationships unearthed the sample from Lyon do seem to hold true in 
other areas of France. 
What then do we make of the upsurge in pious bequests and our 
other findings? We have claimed that growing wealth does not explain 
the rise in pious bequests, although economic fluctuation may have 
caused the dip in the 1680s. What then was responsible for the 
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benificence toward to the Church? 
One obvious candidate would be the status accorded the devout 
in Old Regime society. Moliere's Tartuffe serves as a reminder of the 
respect accorded those who could feign devotion, and a desire for such 
esteem, so one could argue, may have motivated the pious bequests in 
the wills. On closer inspection, however, this seems highly unlikely. 
Perhaps we can never decide whether it was lust for status or concern 
for salvation that spurred on our testators, but it is doubtful that 
questions of status lay at the root of the religious behavior in the 
wills. If a testator were primarily interested in status, why would 
he seek to purchase it in his will, with acts to be performed after 
his death? If we make the absurd assumption that status somehow 
accrued to the dead, why did testators waste their money on low 
masses, which were said in obscure chapels with scarcely a mention of 
the founder's name? A high mass or, better yet, a funeral procession 
would seem to do much more for a testator's status, yet few 
individuals chose these services. The testators, it appears, were 
more interested in anonymous low masses for the repose of their souls 
than in posthumous self glorification. Finally, if a desire for 
status played a major role in the will maker's decision, then there 
ought to be major differences between the wills which were dictated to 
notaries and others, called testements mystiques, which were drawn up 
in private and then hidden from everyone until well after the 
testator's death. Since the authors of the testements mystiques kept 
their bequests secret they would seem to have little concern for 
46 
status. Consequently, their testaments ought to be nearly devoid of 
pious bequests. Yet as Vovelle and Chaunu have discovered, the pious 
bequests in the testaments mystiques are no different from those in 
other wills. 47 
A related explanation for the rise in pious bequests is the 
claim that donations to the Church became fashionable in the 
seventeenth century. The difficulty here is that a will was basically 
a private, secret act, which testators sought to hide from the 
public.48 There were few witnesses, and even the pious bequests were 
not the sort of ostentatious gestures we normally associate with 
fashion. Again, the key is the evidence from the testaments mystiques 
unearthed by Vovelle and Chaunu. If fashion made a difference, these 
testators who hid their last will from everyone ought to have made 
fewer pious bequests, because they were clearly indifferent to 
fashion. Yet as Vovelle and Chaunu demonstrate, they were just as 
likely to leave money to the Church as others. 
Similar difficulties rule out another explanation for the rise 
in pious bequests: that somehow it became easier to leave money for 
masses and the Church. If the 17th century witnessed the building of 
more churchs (so one could argue) or if the minimum offering needed to 
found a mass declined, then religious services would become a relative 
bargain and we might expect an increase in bequests to the Church. 
The problem here is that while more churches were constructed in 
cities such as Lyon, their numbers did not increase in the villages 
where our wills were drawn up. Moreover, in real terms the minimum 
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donation needed for a mass remained roughly constant in the 16th 
century and then increased slightly in the 17th century. And when we 
add the price of a mass to the tobit equations, it does not eliminate 
the growth in pious bequests over time. 
Conceivably, rising prices for certain commodities could have 
driven individuals to spend money on religion; too little is known 
about prices to exclude this possibility altogether. Nevertheless, 
this line of reasoning does seem unlikely, given what we do know about 
items whose demand curves were highly sensative to price. Prices of 
luxuries such as wine and butter declined somewhat rather than rose in 
the 17th century, and consumption of these and other goods with 
elastic price curves actually increased.49 
We can also rule out changes in inheritance taxes as a cause 
of the variation in pious bequests. Strictly speaking, inheritance 
taxes did not exist under the Old Regime. There was a proportionate 
tax on sales and transfers of land, which was collected by the king 
and some seignieurs, but it did not affect most testaments. Even when 
it did apply, it was paid by the person who received a bequest of 
property, not the testator, and it therefore would not influence the 
testator's decision. In fact, none of the dues or taxes paid in the 
Old Regime had any bearing upon a testator's decision to give money to 
the Church.so 
The most likely explanation of the rise in pious bequests is a 
shift in attitudes toward religion. This does not mean that any one 
person's preferences with respect to religion suddenly changed. 
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Rather, it says something about the average configuration of 
preferences and the average set of religious attitudes in the early 
modern period, at least in the countryside around Lyon. If we divide 
individuals according to their wealth, sex, literacy, age and family 
status, then in any single category the fraction of individuals who 
seemed to prefer the solace of Counter-Reformation ritual was far 
larger in 1700 than one hundred years before. At any level of wealth 
(all other things being equal), the number of men and women who placed 
great value upon Tridentine Cathholicism seemed to grow. 
It is, of course, impossible to prove conclusively that 
attitudes and preferences shifted on average. To do so, we would have 
to know all the alternatives a typical testator faced in, say, 1600, 
and we would need the same knowledge of the situation in 1700. 
Finally, we would have to be able to say that the average testator in 
1600 could have acted the way his pious counterpart in 1700 did but 
that he chose not to. In short, we would have to be able to make an 
argument about what economists call ''revealed preference.'' The 
information needed for such an argument will obviously never be 
available. All we can say with certainty is that the evidence is 
consistent with a shift in preferences and attitudes. The number of 
testators who left pious bequests (when they could have given nothing) 
rose dramatically, and this upsurge in donations cannot be explained 
by increasing wealth. A mass of additional evidence also points to a 
shift of attitudes, from the comments of contemporary diarists to the 
changing themes of popular literature, which grew overwhelmingly 
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religious over the course of the seventeenth century. And of course 
many older histories also claim that attachment to Catholicism was on 
the rise. 
Even if we avoid the knotty question of attitudes and 
preferences, it is still undeniable that external religious behavior 
changed. Increasing numbers of men and women left larger and larger 
sums to the Church, and this explosion in pious bequests had important 
financial consequence for ecclesiastical institutions. When testators 
began giving 2% or more of their estates for masses and prayers, the 
Church's income rose substantially. Already the largest single 
landlord in France, the Church saw its revenues jump by an amount 
equal to roughly lO'!b of the royal budget.SI The added funds in 
ecclesiastical coffers helped the Church to build numerous hospitals 
and other institutions in-the 17th century. More important, those who 
dispensed the religious services which men and women prized so highly 
had an effective means of mobilizing individuals to collective action. 
The influential lay and clerical devouts who undertook political and 
social reforms in the 17th century made frequent use of this tactic. 
The changes in behavior also shed light on tho appeal of the 
Counter Reformation had in the countryside. The literate favored the 
rituals of Tridentine Catholicism and so did women. This reinforces 
what we know about the support the Counter Reformation received among 
the educated and the hostility it encountered among rural males. The 
religious split between men and women in the 17th and 18th centuries 
layed the groundwork for the far more bitter political divisions of 
the nineteenth century, when male anticlerics battled the Church in 
the political arena and women became its chief supporters. 
so 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. Archives d6partementales du Rhone (henceforth AD Rhone), 3E.8912, 
f. 121. 
2. (Paris, 1973) 
3. (Paris, 1978) 
4. One sign of this acceptance is the fact that numerous projects 
involving wills are now underway not just in France but in 
Germany and Italy as well. 
5. Vovelle, pp. 49-55, 313, ·391-92, 424; Chaunu, p. 234. 
6. At the very least, statistical techniques would keep researchers 
like Vovelle and Chaunu and their teams of graduate students from 
spending too much time on wills. Chaunu and his students read 
thousands of wills; so did Vovelle and his assistants. By using 
quantitative methods, they could have reached firmer conclusions 
with far fewer wills. 
7. The wills were collected from microfilms made by the Mormon 
Church. The lrlormons are in the process of microfilming all the 
notarial registers at the AD Rhone, and the notaries they 
selected to begin the project are not peculiar in any respect. 
From their list of microfilmed registers, I chose notaries from 
communities where a large number of records had been preserved 
and then selected notarial registers at random. This sort of 
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sampling scheme (it is actually a cluster sample) will not affect 
my analysis in any way provided that the criterion used for 
choosing the registers was not based upon the values of my 
dependent variable. This is in fact the case. My choice of a 
notarial register was related to some of the independent 
variables (the years which the register spans, for example), but 
this sort of relationship would not affect a regression. More 
important, there is no reason to believe that a direct 
relationship exists between the dependent variable (the value of 
pious bequests in a will) and the fact that a will was registered 
and ended up in a particular notarial register. Wills were 
registered with notaries for reasons unrelated to pious bequests: 
a will, whether it contained pious bequests or not, was simply 
invalid without notarial registration. Similarly, people chose 
notaries for reasons having nothing to do with their religious 
behavior. Thus, my selection of notarial registers is not 
related to my dependent variable, and there is no problem with 
sample bias. For a list of the notarial registers used, see 
appendix I. It should be pointed out tha~ in the 18th century 
approximately 3Cl'li of the populace left wills in some areas of the 
Lyonnais and 7<11> in others; see Claude Aboucaya, Le testament 
lyonnais de la fin du xye au milieu du XVIIIe siecle (Lyon, 
1961), pp. 152-53. Like Vovelle and Chaunu, my sample of wills 
overlooks the poor, who did not leave testaments, and it 
overrepresents the rich. Again, however, this sort of 
53 
overrepresentation will not affect my results. 
8. The only exceptions were small, involuntary fees payed the parish 
vestry (the fabrigue). Since these were not a matter of choice, 
they were excluded. The number of wills affected was minor. 
9. See Philip T. Hoffman, ''Church and Community: The Parish Clergy 
and the Counter Reformation in the Diocese of Lyon (1500-1789),'' 
(Ph.D. disseration, Yale University, 1979), pp. 316-19. 
10. Chaunu, pp. 331-37; Daniel Roche, ''La m~moire de la mort,'' 
Annales E.S.C. (1976), number 2, pp. 76-119. 
11. I have chosen K to be equal to the number of unmarried children 
in the household; the results would not change appreciably if K 
were the total number of children, married and unmarried. 
12. This is clearly a better method than trying to specify a 
relationship involving the ratio of M divided by W. An equation 
involving the ratio would be difficult to interpret and subject 
to sample bias since wealth might have influenced to decision to 
draw up a will. And in any case, questions about the ratio can 
be reduced to questions about the linear equation for M, as I 
show below. 
13. See, for example, G.S. Maddala, Econometrics (New York, 1977), 
pp. 162-182, or James Tobin, ''Estimation of Relationships for 
Limited Dependent Variables,'' Econometrica 26 (1958): 24-36. 
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Note that with the tobit specification, the expected rate of 
change of ~ with respect to Y still has the same sign as the 
coefficient c'. The san1e holds true for the rate of change of~ 
with respect to S, L, and the other independent variables, so we 
can still reduce questions about the sign of the ration~ to 
questions about the signs of the tobit coefficients. 
14. For purposes of comparison, I have included OLS and probit 
estimates of equation 1' in appendix II. 
15. The method is outlined in Henri Theil, Principles of Econometrics 
(New York, 1971), pp. 548-550. If I were not dealing with 
limited dependent variables, the least squares estimate of c' 
would have expected value c' + pb', where pis the coefficient of 
Yin the ''auxiliary'' regression of Won the other independent 
variables. I have made the reasonable assumption that b' > 0, 
and I argue below that wealth is not increasing over time, i.e., 
that p i O. Hence, pb' < 0, and omitting W would lead to an 
underestimate of c', if I were not dealing with a limited 
dependent variable. In this case, if the estimate of c' exceeded 
0, I could be reasonably certain that c' was actually positive. 
Similar results would hold for S and L. 
16. See, however, Adonis Yatchew and Zvi Griliches, ''Specification 
Error in Probit and Logit Models,'' Harvard Institute of Economic 
Research Discussion Paper 717 (1979). Unfortunately, the results 
of this paper are not of great use in practice. 
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17. Information about taxes and marriage contracts comes from Georges 
Durand, Vin, vigne et vignerous en Lyonnais et Beaujolais (Paris, 
1979), pp. 351-53, 432-64. 
18. I have excluded clergymen from the wealth hierarchy and from the 
analysis that follows. As might be expected, they are far more 
likely to make pious bequests than laymen. 
19. In addition to information in Durand, which comes from the period 
1500 to 1800, see the evidence concerning 18th-century marriage 
contracts in Maurice Garden, Lyon et les lyonnais (Lyon, 1970). 
20. A good wage series for 17th-century Lyon is not yet available, so 
I used a series for Parisian carpenters published in M. Baulant, 
''Le salaire des ouvriers du batiment a Paris de 1400 a 1726,'' 
Annales E.S.C. 26 (1971): 463-83. Given labor's mobility, these 
wage rates in Paris should parallel those in and around Lyon, and 
evidence from the 16th century tends to b~ar this out. Figures 
on agricultural rents come from Durand, pp. 491-97. Both the 
wage and rental series were adjusted for inflation using a ten-
year average series of grain prices. This technique is open to 
obvious objections, but for reasons I discuss below it seemed the 
best way to deflate the price series. In any case, alternative 
deflators, such as converting prices to grams of silver, lead to 
nearly indentical results. 
23. Chaunu, pp. 395-96, 414-17. 
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24. Formally, we adjust the units of T so that we can assume 
W = T + e, where e is an error term. The monetary figures in 
Table 1, like all the others in this paper, have been deflated 
using a ten-year moving average of local wheat prices to 
compensate for the changing value of the livre. Although using 
wheat prices as a deflator is common a~ong social and economic 
historians, it is open to rather obvious criticisms, especially 
when it is used to compare fortunes across time. Unfortunately, 
it is one of the few alternatives available in the absence of a 
good consumer price index. The justification for using wheat is 
that along with other grains it formed a major part of the 
consumer budget under the Old Regime. It was also a major 
producer product. The ten-year moving averages should in turn 
eliminate the effects of short term fluctuations in the price of 
grain. An alternative method of deflation would be to convert 
livres to silver. I did this for all of the monetary variables 
in the paper, and although it changed some of the coefficients 
slightly, it did not affect any of the hypothesis tests. 
Overall, the grain index and the silver index move in parallel, 
and the fact that both methods yield similar results suggest that 
the conclusions are not sensative to the choice of a deflator. 
21. Aboucaya, pp. 21-24, 151-52. See also Alarie Ther6se Lorcin, ''Les 
/ 
clauses religieuses dans les testaments du plat pays au XIVe et 
XVe sHcles, '' Le Moyen Age 78(1972) :287-323; M. Gonon, Les 
institutions et la soc1et6 en Forez d'apres les testaments 
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(Macon, 1960). 
22. Durand, pp. 364-68, describes the case of the Damours, a large 
and prosperous family of 18th-century peasants. Francois Damour 
and his wife Jeanne Magnini had seven surviving children; their 
family was extraordinarily large for the time. If any family is 
likely to violate the assumption of equal treatment, it is a 
large one like this. However, if we examine the records of 
Francois Damour's succession and the various marriage contracts 
and other familial agreements he entered into before his death, 
it is clear that the egalitarian assumption yields a very good 
approximation for the total value of the estate. Francois does 
favor his eldest son Isaac, the universal heir, but once we 
subtract the obligations Isaac is saddled with, his advantage 
diminishes considerably. Basically, Isaac received the family's 
major piece of land, which Durand estimates to be worth less than 
2600 livres. Assume it is worth 2600 livres. We should also 
include in the Damour fortune approximately 1600 livres already 
distributed to other siblings in money or land, and an 
indeterminate amount of cash and liquid assets. Let us make the 
generous assumption the liquid assests are worth 500 livres, the 
amount Isaac owed his relatives immediately upon his father's 
death. The net value of the estate is thus approximately 4700 
livres. Now Isaac must pay his siblings and mother future 
doweries and pensions worth at least 1400 livres. Isaac's 
portion is thus less than 2600 + 500 - 500 - 1400 = 1200 livres. 
58 
In other words, even under the most generous assumptions, Isaac's 
share is less than 1200 livres, which is twice the dowery 
accorded the unmarried daughter Marie. At most, then, Isaac gets 
a double share, and in fact he probably gets less. In any case, 
the egalitarian assumption leads to a very accurate estimate of 
the estate's total value. With eight heirs and a dowery of 600 
livres. we would estimate the estate to be worth 4800 livres The 
documents suggest that the estate was in fact worth 4700 livres. 
The egalitarian assumption leads to equally accurate predictions 
for the handful of wills in which an estate value is given. 
25. For the legitime in the Lyonnais, see Aboucaya, pp. 119-21. For a 
family with four or fewer children, the children who were not 
universal heirs had a right to equal share of at least one third 
of the estate. For families with four or more than four 
children, they had a right to share at least one half the estate. 
Parents and certain other relatives also had legitime rights. 
This may seem like a significant departure from equal 
inheritance, but for my purposes all that matters is that the 
third wealth proxy not be misleading. As I show below, even the 
maximum possible inequality (namely, giving each heir his 
legitime) does not lead to a significantly different wealth 
proxy. 
26. Durand, pp. 363-86. 
27. Durand, pp. 249, 447-448, 508-09. 
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28. In what follows, I have included all family heirs mentioned in 
the will, including spouses, nephews, cousins, and godchildren. 
This may lead to an overestimate of the estate's value, but the 
alternative -- restricting heirs to nuclear family members only 
- would ignore sizeable bequests to others. Moreover, the high 
estimate may compensate for any slight tendency to favor the 
universal heir. Fortunately, my results do not seem to be 
sensative to this choice, for limiting the number of heirs to 
children or even to dependent children who had not yet been 
provided for in marriage contracts leads to nearly identical 
results. So does the assumption that wealth is simply a linear 
function of the dowery alone or of the dowery and the number of 
children. Strictly speaking, I should have added to D any 
amounts included in pious bequests, but since these are all 
relatively small, it is safe to omit them. Another minor problem 
with the three wealth proxies should also be mentioned: in 
effect, each one measures wealth at a different time. The first 
wealth proxy probably measures wealth averaged over the person's 
entire life. The second (T} assesses it at the moment he draws 
up his will. The third (D} approximates wealth at some time 
prior to the drawing up of the will, since it takes into account 
money that is disbursed for doweries before the will is actually 
drawn up. The question then is to decide which of these 
imperfect wealth measures actually serves as the budget 
constraint when the individual makes his will. One could make a 
case for any one of them, but it is reassuring that in the end 
the choice makes no difference. 
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One final objection to the wealth proxies should also be 
faced. It could be argued that the proxies D and T measure not 
the size of a testator's fortune but rather the portion of his 
estate left· to his family. From this point of view, the proxy 
based on doweries -D- is simply an index of a testator's 
generosity to his daughters, and the total value T of his 
bequests merely reflects his legacy to his children and other 
related heirs. The link between D and T is therefore hardly 
surprising (so one could argue}, but instead of holding wealth 
constant, our equations in fact merely fix the amount of money a 
testator gave his family. Thus any increase in pious bequests we 
might observe would not necessarily be a sign of heightened 
religious fervor; rather, it could be a mark of the family's 
losses. If our testator spent more on his salvation, he did so 
because he simply cared less about his relatives. 
The problem with this criticism is that it ignores the 
first wealth proxy. Based on occupation and information from tax 
records, the first measure of wealth has no direct connection 
with the testator's generosity to his family. And this first 
proxy, it turns out, yields nearly the same regression 
coefficients as the other two. Moreover, the argument against 
the proxies T and D completely ignores the links Chaunu 
established between the size of the estate and the value of 
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bequests in the will. It also neglects the evidence for 
egalitarian inheritances in the Lyonnais. Finally, while it is 
true that a testator had to divide his fortune between the Church 
and his heirs and that a pious bequest thus came at the expense 
of the family, the portion left the Church was in all cases a 
small fraction of the total fortune. Therefore we can readily 
substitute the remainder~ the familial bequests F ~ for the 
total fortune W without seriously affecting the coefficients of W 
or any other independent variable. If, for example, the value of 
pious bequests M is a linear function of Y and W (we ignore error 
terms and the other variables for the sake of simplicity), then 
M = a + bY + cW for constants a, b, c. Hence 
M = a+ bY + c(M + F), since W = M + F. Therefore 
M = __IL_ + (~lb )Y + (~le )F. 1 - c -c -c Since only a small fraction of 
pious bequests is spent on pious bequests, c is much smaller than 
Thus -1 c and -1 b are - c - c (We have assumed c > 0.) one. 
approximately equal to c and b respectively, and replacing W with 
F will hardly disturb any of the coefficients. They will remain 
close to the value they had in the original equation which 
included W. 
29. If we make the worst possible assumption -- namely, that the 
testator gave only the legitime to legatees other than the 
universal heir -- we could derive another measure of wealth L. 
For families with K children, 
L = 3 
L = 2 
(k - l)d 
(k - l)d 
(2 ~ k i 4) 
(4 < k) 
where d is the average dowery there we have neglected the 
legitime of heirs other than children; their rightful portions 
would only bring the 'estate closer to equality. It turns out 
that L is closely correlated with the proxy D, and using L in 
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place of D in our tobit equation does not change the coefficients 
significantly. This is true whether we choose K to be the actual 
number of children, the number of unmarried children, or even the 
total number of heirs. For example, if in the formula for L we 
let K equal total number of heirs, then L and D are very highly 
correlated (r = .995), and a regression shows that the 
relationship between L and D does not change over time. If we 
insert L into equation 2', the results are very close to what we 
obtain using D or any of the other wealth proxies. The same 
results hold if we let K equal the number of children or the 
number of unmarried children: L always behaves in much the same 
manner as does D. 
30. Ilistorians have generally accepted the ability to sign as a mark 
of literacy. Testators, incidentally, were asked if they could 
sign, at least after 1580. The only problem was therefore caused 
by a handful of wills in which the testator was said to be too 
weak to sign, and another small number (mostly from the early 
16th century) in which the testator was not asked to sign. In 
both instances, I considered the testator illiterate (since this 
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was the norm in the countryside) unless he belonged to a literate 
profession, such as the judiciary. One more remark about 
literacy should be made. It could be argued that literacy itself 
is a random variable which changes over time. If so, then I 
really ought to be dealing with a simultaneous system, in which 
there is an equation for L as well as an equation for M. This 
argument, though, overlooks the fact that men and women learned 
to read long before they drew up their wills, and so any belief 
in simultaneity strains credulity. Even if I were to construct 
such a simultaneous system, it is reasonable to argue that it 
would be recursive, with literacy dependent on the exogenous 
variables only. In this case, I could go ahead and estimate 
equation 2' separately with single equation techniques even 
though it involves limited dependent variables (see James J. 
Heckman, ''Dumn1y Endogenous Variables in a Simultaneous Equation 
System,'' Econometrica 46(1978): 931-959). Alternatively, I could 
ignore the recursiveness and apply either two-stage least squares 
or the more appropriate two-stage techniques described in 
Heckman. I have done so, and the coefficient estimates I obtain 
are very close to the results with single equation methods. 
31. For a tobit equation y* Xb + e, with 
Y = y* if y* > O and Y = O if y* < o aECYl = b F(Xb) 
- • ax. i s • 
1 
where X is the matrix of independent variable observations, b the 
• vector of coefficients, e the error term, Y the latent variable, 
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s the standard deviation of e, and F the cumulative standard 
normal distribution. 
32. For a tobit equation with latent variable y* Xb + e, 
:>&'ID\ b. ~ = f (!1!.) ...!. 
ax. s s 
1 
• where P is the probability that Y is positive, X is the matrix 
of independent variables, f is the standard noraml density, s is 
the standard deviations of e, and b. is the coefficient of X .. 
1 1 
33. This assumes that the independent variables are fixed at their 
mean values. For a large change in the date, this assumption 
obviously cannot hold true. 
34. See Maddala, pp. 155-62, 292-302, or Theil, pp. 607-14, for the 
method of doing this. 
35. See Yatchew and Griliches, p. 16. and David Levine, ''The Impact 
of Small Errors-in-Variables on Maximum Likelihood Estimation,'' 
unpublished paper, M.I.T. Department of Economics, July, 1980. 
Neither paper presents results which immediate1y reveal the sign 
of the bias. However, they both contain approximations for the 
asymptotic bias, and if available tobit and probit computer 
programs were modified, it would be possible to calculate these 
approximations. Levine's formula, which uses a Taylor series 
expansion, would be the easiest to use, since it applies to any 
maximum likelihood estimator. Even so, the calculations involved 
would be complicated. 
36. For the two-stage estimator in cases with limited dependent 
variables, see Heckman, op. cit; Forest Nelson and Lawrence 
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Olson, ''Specification and Estimation of a Simultaneous - Equation 
Model with Limited Dependent Variables,'' International Economic 
Review, vol. 19, no. 3 (1978): 695-709; and Takeshi Amemya, ''The 
Estimation of a Simultaneous - Equation Tobit Model, '' 
International Economic Review, vol. 20, no. 1 (1979): 169-181. 
The method I used is that described in Nelson's paper. The 
asymptotic t-statistics reported in the second stage of the 
probit and tobit equations are not correct, and they will not be 
reported here. For purposes of comparison, the corrected two--
stage least squares t-statistics (which are only meant to be 
indicative) are as follows for the independent variables Y, S and 
L: 
Variable t-statistic 
y 3.33 
s 2.46 
L 3.78 
coefficients for Y and S significantly, although it does boost 
the coefficient of L. Once again, we have evidence that our 
estimators are robust. 
66 
37. If the independent variables are assumed to be normally 
distributed, then dividing the OLS coefficients by the proportion 
of non-limit observation yields consistent estimates of the tobit 
coefficients; see William H. Greene, ''On the Asymptotic Bias of 
the Ordinary Least Squares Estimator of the Tobit Model,'' 
Econometrica 49 (1981): 505-513. The bias induced in the tobit 
equation by the use of proxies will therefore be a positive 
multiple of the OLS bias, which can be deduced using 
specification analysis. It is clear, of course, that my 
independent variables are not normally distributed; Greene 
argues, however, that his results are quite robust. 
38. Mary Kathryn Norberg, ''Rich and Poor in Grenoble (1630-1800)'' 
(Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1978). 
39. Hoffman, pp. 161-68, and passim. 
40. Durand, pp. 495-97. 
41. The index I used came from Joseph Goy and Emmanuel Le Roy 
I performed similar instrumental variables estimates using proxy Ladurie, Les fluctuations du produit de la dime (Paris, 1972), p. 
III in place of proxy II, and once again the coefficients of Y, 
S, and L showed little change. One additional fact also deserves 
mention: omitting W from the equation does no~ affect the 
158: rente fonciere from the Chapter of S. Paul. Durand, pp. 
495-97, gives a much better index, but since it does not cover 
the entire period, I was forced to use the figures from S. Paul. 
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42. 11ie price of a mass was fixed by the diocese and often mentioned 
in the wills; I have divided it by the price of grain to get a 
price in real terms. The population, measured in households 
(feux), comes from a late 17th-century inquiry conducted by the 
intendents; see .Maurice Garden, et al, Paroisses et communes de 
France: Rhone. Dictionnaire d'histoire administrative et 
demographigue (Paris, 1978), Several communities were not 
covered in the inquiry; since these were likely to be small, they 
were assigned 300 households, an average figure for a good sized 
village. 
43. See appendix II for a probit estimate of P directly. The probit 
equation predicts a much higher level of Pat the end of the 17th 
century. One further topic of interest would be to see if there 
are any interaction effects involving the independent variables, 
There is some slight evidence of a sex-wealth interaction, but 
multicollinearity rules out a clear test. The evidence (which is 
only marginal) for a sex-wealth interaction appears when we add 
an interaction term to an OLS or probit equation for P; it is 
absent, however, in the more important OLS or tobit equation for 
M. The sex-wealth effect is in any case difficult to discern 
because the interaction term and wealth are highly correlated. 
There is no evidence for wealth-time interactions. 
The simple statistical model I am using also rules out 
any answer to another question: whether literacy gave 
individuals a greater dose of Tridentine indoctrination or 
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whether it simply exposed them to the Counter Reformation at an 
earlier date. Neither probit, tobit nor OLS can distinguish 
between the two possibilities in the linear equation 2'. 
A final question of interest can be answered. The 
question is the following: does the upsurge in pious giving 
start more suddenly and end more abrubtly than the linear 
equations suggest? Was there, in other words, an early period of 
no change in religious behavior and, at the end, a similar period 
when change halted? I answered this question by determining 
whether pious giving flattened out in the early period before 
1625 and then again after 1700. Tests revealed no evidence for 
such flattening either before 1625 or after 1700. Indeed, giving 
appears to increase after 1700, which probably reflects the 
downward bias of our estimate of the coefficient of Y. 
44. One additional benefit of the t-statistics is that we can decide 
when relationships are significant without having to assemble the 
sort of enormous samples Vovelle and Chaunu put together, 
45. In addition to the various deflators and wealth proxies discussed 
in this paper, I also investigated using doweries alone as an 
index of wealth, and I did the same with gifts to sons. Again, 
the results were similar, 
46. The Grenoble study, which is being conducted by Mary Kathryn 
Norberg, has the advantage of treating both Protestants and 
Catholics. Although the Grenoble Protestants could give either 
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to the Protestant consistory or to charity, pious bequests in 
their wills were far less frequent than in Catholic wills, and in 
contrast to Grenoble Catholics, bequests by Protestants actually 
dropped in the seventeenth century. Since the occupational 
differences between Protestants and Catholics are controlled for, 
the only difference between the two groups is religious. This 
fact lends further support to the contention that it was religion 
(and in particular the Counter Reformation) which drove pious 
bequests upward in the 17th century. 
47. Vovelle, pp. 45-57; Chaunu, pp. 233-236. Unfortunately, nearly 
all of my wills were drawn up before a notary. It should be 
pointed out that even testaments mystiques had to be registered 
with a court or a notary. They were duly registered, but they 
remained sealed. 
4 8. Aboucaya, p. 153. 
49. See Henri Hauser, Recherches et documents sur l'histoire des prix 
en France de 1500 A 1800 (Paris, 1936), pp. 138, 204, 405-06, for 
butter and wine prices in various parts of France; see also 
Durand, op. cit., for wine prices in the Lyonnais. Cf. the 
similar argument in Jan de Vries, The Economy of Europe in an Age 
of Crisis, 1600-1750, (Cambridge, 1976), pp. 84-85. 
SO. The transfer taxes (which were really a tax on sales) did not 
apply to inheritances in which a child or spouse was the 
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universal heir. They were levied on real property only and were 
paid by the recipients of the property. Taxes on bequests of 
land to the Church (amortissement, etc.) were also payed by the 
religious institution receiving the property, not the testator. 
See Aboucaya, pp. 89-90, 135-38; Marcel Marion, Dictionnaire des 
institutions de la France aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siecles (Paris, 
1923), s.v. ''Lods et ventes,'' ''Mainmorte,'' ''Amortissement,'' 
''Succession''; Roger Doucet, Les institutions de la France au XVIe 
siecle, 2 vols. (Paris, 1948), 1: 478, 484-85. 
51. Chaunu, p. 418. 
NOTARY 
Bertrand 
Jaques 
Cluniet 
Godebert 
Bollioud 
Go tail 
Lentilhon 
Demas so 
Gastible 
Fabry 
Chapuis 
Michaud 
Agnes 
Dubost 
Vincent 
Bur lat 
l~ichon 
Mermet 
APPENDIX I 
NOTARIAL REGISTERS USED IN SAMPLES 
AD RHONE COTE 
3El028 
3E8901 
3E8891-8892 
3E889 5_;889 7 
3El004 
3E8721-8722 
3E8902, 8907, 8913 
3El415 
3El 
3E2 
3E3 
3E4 
3E5 
3E38 
3E8588 
3E2190-2192, 2235-2239 
3E56-57 
3E1027 
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APPENDIX II 72 
OLS AND PROBIT ESTIMATES FOR P 
(P=O IF THE WILL CONTAINS PIOUS BEQUESTS, 0 OTHERWISE) 
INDEPENDENT WEALTH WEALTH WEALTH 
VARIABLE PROXY I PROXY u PROXY III 
OLS PROBIT OLS PROB IT OLS PROBIT 
CONSTAL"IT -7 .507 -25.494 -7.470 -25.205 -7.540 -26.025 
(-12.64) (-12 .36) (-8 .08) 
WEALTH VARIABLES 
xl 0.919 x 10 -1 3.273 x 10 -1 
(1.12) (1.17) 
x2 0.393 x 10 -1 1.660 x 10 -1 
(0. 97) (1.15) 
T -4 -4 ----- ----- 0.183 x 10 1.079 x 10 
(1. 38) (1. 71) 
D -4 -4 ----- ----- ----- ----- 0.479 x 10 1.532 x 10 
(2 .51) (2. 38) 
OTHER INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
y 0.481 x 10 -2 1.532 x 10 -2 0.481 x 10 -2 1.521 x 10 -2 0.482 x 10 -2 1.559 x 10 -2 
(15 .68) (12.50) (15 .32) (12.25) (10.06) (8.04) 
s 0.261 x 10 -1 0 .826 x 10 -1 0.412 x 10 -1 1.393 x 10 -1 0.387 x 10 -1 1.382 x 10 -1 
(0.74) (0.64) (1.14) (1.08) (0.69) (0.69) 
L 0.170 x 10 -1 0 .445 x 10 -1 0.558 x 10 -1 1. 772 x 10 -1 0.199 x 10 -1 0.415 x 10 -1 
(0. 25) (0.19) (0. 96) (0. 87) (0. 22) (0 .14) 
A -0.127 -0.461 -0.151 -0.539 -0.263 - .794 
(1.66) (-1.64) (1.95) (-1.91) (-1.54) (-1.37) 
K -0.965 x 10-2 -3.289 x 10 -2 -1.854 x 10 -2 -7.065 x 10-2 -1.152 x 10 -2 -5.036 x 10 
-2 
(1.04) (-0 .98) (1. 95) (-2.02) (-.l:..05) (-0.98) 
s 
R2 
F 
-2 x log 
likelihood 
ratio 
N 
% Actual Yes 
% Actual No 
% Predicted 
Correctly 
WEALTH 
PROXY I 
OLS 
0.403 
32.5% 
33.98 
(7,568)df 
576 
38.5% 
62.5% 
APPENDIX II 
(CONTINUED) 
WEALTH 
PROXY II 
PRO BIT OLS PROB IT 
----- 0.405 -----
43.9% 32.8% 44.9% 
----- 43.61 -----
----- (6 ,537) -----
208.45 ----- 200. 70 
7df ----- 6df 
576 544 544 
38.5% 40.6% 40.6% 
62.5% 59.4% 59.4% 
72. 7% ----- 72.1% 
Note: The number in the parentheses is the value of the coefficient divided by its estimated 
standard deviation. All monetary amounts in deflated livres. Number of cases varies 
due to discarded missing values. Values of all variables defined in Table 3. 
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WEALTH 
PROXY III 
OLS PROB IT 
0.407 
32.8% 44.9% 
19.28 
(6,237)df 
----- 90.53 
6df 
244 244 
39 .8% 39 .8% 
60.2% 60.2% 
73.0% 
